Results of Monetary Priceless on Political Coordination

Les effets de l’absence de prix monétaire sur la coordination politique

François Facchini ()

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This paper studies the implications of the lack of monetary prices for the modes of individuals calculus' coordination on the "political market". On the economic market, the evaluation of decision costs is based on monetary prices. The entrepreneurs' decisions are led by the profit expectations they build on the information embodied in market prices. Given that there is no price on the "political market", how are individuals informed? What are their incentives to act? And how are their actions coordinated? It is argued that 1) the electoral system provides information on the individuals' preferences between "being candidate" and "being represented", 2) the individuals are induced to be candidate since the existing political supply does not meet their expectations, and 3) the coordination is achieved through ideology that acts as a signaling mechanism.

Keywords: coordination; price; market process; money; ideology; Idéologie; Coordination; Prix; monnaie; marché politique (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-01-01
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Published in Journal des économistes et des études humaines, 2000, 10 (2/3), pp.345-362. ⟨10.2202/1145-6396.1151⟩

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Working Paper: Results of Monetary Priceless on Political Coordination (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-04235362

DOI: 10.2202/1145-6396.1151

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