Welfare state, rent seeking and interest groups

Etat Providence, recherche de rente et activité des groupes d'intérêt

François Facchini (facchini@univ-paris1.fr)
Additional contact information
François Facchini: UP1 UFR02 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - École d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: The origin of the welfare state is a core social issue for public finance in the 20th century. The welfare state is said to be established in a country whose state finances education, health, pensions and housing. All these goods are private goods financed by taxation or merit goods. These goods are produce by state because state generates rent. Then, the main reason for ever growing social expenditure, it holds, is rent-seeking. Welfare expenditure increases because the democratic process allocates rents. In this perspective, the welfare state expanded as result of an investment in rent-seeking. Social expenditure is a system of net transfers to the best organized interest groups i.e. the middle class interest group (Tullock 1983, Anderson 1987). This chapter uses this model to explain poverty programs, intergenerational transfers, health expenditure, education spending and social housing.

Keywords: Rent seeking; Interest group; Health; Education; housing; poverty; Etat providence; Recherche de rente; Groupe d'intérêt; Dépenses éducatives; Dépenses logement et mobilité; Pauvreté (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05-03
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Handbook on the Political Economy of Social Policy, Edward Elgar Publishing; Edward Elgar Publishing, pp.67-78, 2024, ⟨10.4337/9781035306497.00011⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-04584030

DOI: 10.4337/9781035306497.00011

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD (hal@ccsd.cnrs.fr).