Mutual Insurance and the Governance of Risk: User Control and Institutional Change

Arthur Charpentier () and Pierre-Charles Pradier ()
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Arthur Charpentier: UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal
Pierre-Charles Pradier: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Why do policyholders sometimes replace market contracting with member governance, and what does that governance change? We develop a dynamic institutional account of mutual insurance linking comparative governance, collective action, property rights, and institutional change. Relative to investor-owned entry or voice-only responses, mutual entry is most plausible when users possess group-specific coordination assets and when changing a contested insurance rule creates gains that are hard to secure through ordinary contracting. The direction of change depends on both the rule over which members acquire influence and the distribution of interests within the coalition. Success may then reshape competition and internal governance in different ways. Economic convergence depends on how readily an innovation can be transferred, whereas governance sustainability depends on the persistence of effective member control. Four historical cases show that user ownership need not create the informational or organizational resource on which a mutual relies. Its distinctive role may instead be to couple user-produced resources with control and collective benefit rights.

Keywords: mutual insurance; user ownership; institutional change; cooperatives; risk governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09-28
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