Foreign aid and power play: Political cycles in world bank’s procurement allocation
Antoine Boucher (),
Lisa Chauvet and
Marin Ferry
Additional contact information
Antoine Boucher: Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Georg-August-University of Goettingen = Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Abstract:
This paper examines the existence of political cycles in the awarding of World Bank procurement contracts around elections. We analyze elections in the home country of firms winning these contracts, distinguishing between firms based in the aid recipient country (i.e., domestic firms) and those from other supplier countries (i.e., foreign firms). Our findings indicate that domestic firms are more likely to secure larger contracts around elections in their home country, especially when corporate donations to candidates are allowed. Additionally, our results reveal an increase in contract sizes awarded to foreign firms before elections in their home country. This cross-border political cycle appears to be driven by strong aid partnerships and historical colonial ties between the supplier and recipient countries. These findings reveal a political dimension in procurement dynamics with potential implications for development resource allocation. Understanding these patterns can help enhance the transparency and effectiveness of aid-funded contracting.
Keywords: Cross-border influence; Elections Political cycles; Procurement; Foreign aid (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2027-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Published in World Development, 2027, 209, pp.107582. ⟨10.1016/j.worlddev.2026.107582⟩
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Related works:
Journal Article: Foreign aid and power play: Political cycles in world bank’s procurement allocation (2027) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-05850221
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2026.107582
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().