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Strategic formation of production networks

Antoine Mandel (), Van-Quy Nguyen () and Bach Dong-Xuan
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Antoine Mandel: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CLIMAFIN - 20 rue de Vintimille - 75009 Paris - Climate Finance Alpha
Van-Quy Nguyen: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UEL - University of Economics and Law [Vietnam National University, HCM] - VNU-HCM - Vietnam National University, Ho Chi Minh City / Đại học Quốc gia TP. Hồ Chí Minh, EPEE - Centre d'Etudes des Politiques Economiques - UEVE - Université d'Évry-Val-d'Essonne - Université Paris-Saclay
Bach Dong-Xuan: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics [Chengdu, China]

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We provide a strategic model of the formation of production networks that subsumes the standard general equilibrium approach. The objective of firms in our setting is to choose their supply relationships so as to maximize their profit at the general equilibrium that unfolds. We show that this objective is equivalent to the maximization by the firms of their eigenvector centrality in the production network. As is common in network formation games based on centrality, there are multiple Nash equilibria in our setting. We have investigated the characteristics and social efficiency of these equilibria in a stylized version of our model representing international trade networks. We show that the impact of network structure on social welfare is firstly determined by a trade-off between costs of increasing process complexity and positive spillovers on productivity induced by the diversification of the input mix. We further analyze a variant of our model that accounts for the risks of disruption of supply relationships. In this setting, we characterize how social welfare depends on the structure of the production network, the spatial distribution of risks, and the process of shock aggregation in supply chains. We finally show that simple trade policies characterized by sets of links that are either prevented or catalyzed can be a powerful equilibrium selection device.

Keywords: General equilibrium; Network formation; Supply chain; Production networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-06
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Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2026, 158, pp.630-656. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.004⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-05858720

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.004

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