Beliefs and Pareto Efficient Sets: A Remark

Thibault Gajdos () and Jean-Marc Tallon

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We show that, in a two-period economy with uncertainty in the second period, if an allocation is Pareto optimal for a given set of beliefs and remains optimal when these beliefs are changed, then the set of optimal allocations of the two economies must actually coincide. We identify equivalence classes of beliefs giving rise to the same set of Pareto optimal allocations.

Keywords: Beliefs; Pareto Optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00085912
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Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, 106 (2), pp.467-471. ⟨10.1006/jeth.2001.2899⟩

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Journal Article: Beliefs and Pareto Efficient Sets: A Remark (2002)
Working Paper: Beliefs and Pareto Efficient Sets: A Remark (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00085912

DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2899

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