Why do North African firms involve in corruption?

Clara Delavallade

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This paper empirically analyzes the main microeconomic determinants of different forms of corruption supply. Our study is based on a new database of near 600 Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian firms. We show that the undeclared part of firms' sales is a major factor of their involvement in administrative corruption. The latter increases with the part of the firm's informal activity as far as it is inferior to 55% of total sales, before slightly decreasing. State capture is rather strengthened by a failing enforcement of property and contract rights. Moreover, both forms of corruption help to compensate a loss of competitiveness, which contradicts previous results on this issue. Finally, we draw a comparison of the factors of corruption in North Africa, Uganda and transition countries and derive policy recommendations.

Keywords: North Africa; Supply of corruption; administrative corruption; state capture; informal activity; competitiveness; Corruption active; activité informelle; compétivité; Afrique du Nord; corruption administrative; captation de l'Etat (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00143412
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in 2007

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Related works:
Working Paper: Why do North African firms involve in corruption? (2007)
Working Paper: Why do North African firms involve in corruption? (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00143412

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