Dumbing down rational players: learning and teaching in an experimental game
Antoine Terracol and
Jonathan Vaksmann ()
Additional contact information
Jonathan Vaksmann: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Abstract:
This paper uses experimental data to examine the existence of a teaching strategy among bounded rational players. If players realize that their own actions modify their opponent's beliefs and actions, they might play certain actions to this specific end; and forego immediate payoffs if the expected payoffs if the expected payoff gain from a teaching strategy is high enough. Our results support the existence of a teaching strategy in several ways: First they show that players update their beliefs in order to take account of the reaction of their opponents to their own action. Second, we examine if players actually use a teaching strategy by playing an action that induces a poor immediate payoff but is likely to modify the opponent's behavior so that a preferable outcome might emerge in the future. We find strong evidence of such a strategy in the data and confirm this finding within a logistic model which suggests that the future expected payoff that could arise from a teaching strategy has indeed a significant impact on choice probabilities. Finally, we investigate the effective impact of a teaching strategy on achieved outcomes and find that efficient teachers can successfully use teaching in order to reach their favorite outcome at the expense of their opponents.
Keywords: Game theory; teaching; beliefs; experiment; Théorie des jeux; croyances; expérimentation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-03
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00145436v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Published in 2007
Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00145436v1/document (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game (2009) 
Working Paper: Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game (2009) 
Working Paper: Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game (2009) 
Working Paper: Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game (2009) 
Working Paper: Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game (2009) 
Working Paper: Dumbing down rational players: learning and teaching in an experimental game (2007) 
Working Paper: Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game (2007) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00145436
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().