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On the impossibility of preference aggregation under uncertainty

Thibault Gajdos (), Jean-Marc Tallon () and Jean-Christophe Vergnaud ()
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Jean-Marc Tallon: EUREQUA - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We provide a general theorem on the aggregation of preferences under uncertainty. We study, in the Anscombe-Aumann setting a wide class of preferences, that includes most known models of decision under uncertainty (and state-dependent versions of these models). We prove that aggregation is possible and necessarily linear if (society's) preferences are "smooth". The latter means that society cannot have a non-neutral attitude towards uncertainty on a subclass of acts. A corollary to our theorem is that it is not possible to aggregate maxmin expected utility maximizers, even when they all have the same set of priors. We show that dropping a weak notion of monotonicity on society's preferences allows one to restore the possibility of aggregation of non-smooth preferences.

Keywords: multiple priors; Aggregation; Harsanyi; uncertainty; multiple priors.; Agrégation; incertitude; croyances multiples. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00193578
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Published in 2005

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