Stratégies d'accès à l'estime de soi et relation d'emploi

Olivier Baguelin

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: A model of employment relation is provided in which agents choose whether to seek self-esteem through work. When they do, they develop an intrinsic motivation to effort. Depending on non-wage characteristics of the job the employer wants to fill, she can encourage this intrinsic motivation by a well-designed contract. We show that the profitability as well as the efficiency of the employment relation may depend on non-wage gratification opportunities workers get.

Keywords: intrinsic motivation; self-esteem; moral hazard; profitability; efficiency; motivation intrinsèque; estime de soi; aléa moral; profitabilité; efficacité (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00196110
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Published in 2005

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Related works:
Working Paper: Stratégies d'accès à l'estime de soi et relation d'emploi (2005)
Working Paper: Stratégies d'accès à l'estime de soi et relation d'emploi (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00196110

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