Le contournement des règles contractuelles dans une économie en transition: les salaires non déclarés en Bulgarie

Milena Gradeva and Claude Menard
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Milena Gradeva: ATOM - Analyse Théorique des Organisations et des Marchés - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

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Abstract: The credibility of institutions is an acute problem in "transition" economies. The gap between formal rules and their implementation in Bulgaria is examined in order to account for hidden clauses in employment contracts and fraudulent practices in labor relations. In line with North and Ostrom, several factors are shown to inhibit the internalization of formal rules by economic agents and to provide them with incentives for skirting around the rules. Empirical data from a survey of Bulgarian firms of various size serve as evidence.

Keywords: économie en transition; économie des contrats (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03
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Published in Revue d'Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest, 2008, 39 (1), pp.203-224. ⟨10.4074/S0338059908001095⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Le contournement des règles contractuelles dans une économie en transition: les salaires non déclarés en Bulgarie (2008)
Working Paper: Le contournement des règles contractuelles dans une économie en transition: les salaires non déclarés en Bulgarie (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00273842

DOI: 10.4074/S0338059908001095

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