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Workers behavior and labor contract: an evolutionary approach

Victor Hiller

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This article investigates the co-evolution of labor relationships and workers preferences. According to recent experimental economics findinggs on social preferences, the workforce is assumed to be heterogeneous. It is composed by both cooperative and non-cooperative workers. In addition, firms differ by the type of contract they offer (explicit or implicit). Finally, both the distribution of preferences and the degree of contractual completeness are endogeneized. Preferences evolve through a process of cultural transmission and the proportion of implicit contracts is driven by an evolutionary process. The complementarity between the transmission of cooperation and the implementation of implicit contracts leads to multiple equilibria which allow for path-dependence. This property is illustrated by the evolutions of American and Japanese labor contracts during the Twentieth century.

Keywords: Explicit contract; implicit contract; cultural transmission; preferences for reciprocity; path dependence.; path dependence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-04
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00275734
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Published in 2008

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Related works:
Journal Article: WORKERS' BEHAVIOR AND LABOR CONTRACT: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: WORKERS' BEHAVIOR AND LABOR CONTRACT: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (2010)
Working Paper: Workers behavior and labor contract: an evolutionary approach (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Workers behavior and labor contract: an evolutionary approach (2008) Downloads
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