Earned Wealth, Engaged Bidders? Evidence from a second price auction

Nicolas Jacquemet (), Stephane Luchini (), Robert-Vincent Joule () and Jason Shogren
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Stephane Luchini: GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Robert-Vincent Joule: LPS - Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale - AMU - Aix Marseille Université

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Recent work in experimental economics has explored whether observed behavior depends on whether wealth was windfall or earned. This paper extends this work by considering whether earned wealth ffects bidding behavior in an induced-value second-price auction. We find people bid more sincerely in the auction with earned wealth given monetary incentives; earned wealth did not induce sincere bidding in hypothetical auctions.

Keywords: Auctions; Demand revelation; Experimental valuation; Hypothetical bias; Earned Money (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00277283v1
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Related works:
Journal Article: Earned wealth, engaged bidders? Evidence from a second-price auction (2009)
Working Paper: Earned wealth, engaged bidders? Evidence from a second price auction (2009)
Working Paper: Earned wealth, engaged bidders? Evidence from a second price auction (2009)
Working Paper: Earned wealth, engaged bidders? Evidence from a second price auction (2009)
Working Paper: Earned Wealth, Engaged Bidders? Evidence from a second price auction (2008)
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