Multiplicity, Instability and Sunspots in Games

Julio Dávila

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This paper considers games with two players for which it provides a sufficient condition on the responsiveness of the players' best replies around a Nash equilibrium that implies (i) a multiplicity of Nash equilibria; (ii) the non-isolatedness of this Nash equilibrium as rationalizable strategies; and (iii) the existence of non-trivial correlated equilibria arbitrarily close to it. This simultaneity of multiplicity, instability and vulnerability to sunspots parallels the same pattern observed in overlapping generations economies and finite economies with asymmetric information, and hints at some underlying relation between different avatars of the indeterminacy of economies and games that goes beyond the boundaries of any specific framework. Global links between multiplicity, instability and sunspots are also provided.

Keywords: multiplicity; rationalizability; sunspots; indeterminacy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-06
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Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2003, 39 (3-4), pp.197-217. ⟨10.1016/S0304-4068(03)00008-9⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Multiplicity, instability and sunspots in games (2003)
Working Paper: Multiplicity, Instability and Sunspots in Games (2003)
Working Paper: Multiplicity, Instability and Sunspots in Games (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00286025

DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(03)00008-9

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