 Aid Allocation: comparing donors' behavioursUniversité Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL Abstract: This paper synthesises previous findings on bilateral aid allocation behaviours and compares them with multilateral agency behaviours. It shows that self-interest motives predominate developmental motives in bilateral aid allocation decisions, save for Switzerland and a few Nordic donors. The influence of commercial interests plays a major role in this respect and has a much higher quantitative influence on aid allocation than geopolitical motives. Among developmental motives, recipients' needs play a significant role, together with political governance. Bilateral aid allocation is also influenced by multilateral aid flows. Among multilateral donors, the European Commission (EC) has a quite specific behaviour, with a small role played by recipients' needs and merits, and a strong bias in favour of ACP countries. Conversely, multilateral aid, excluding EC's assistance, strongly responds to recipients' needs. Significant influences of US and Japanese commercial interests on multilateral aid decisions, and of British commercial interests on EC's aid, are also detected Keywords: Aid allocation; bilateral aid; and multilateral aid; allocation de l'aide (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Swedish Economic Policy Review, 2006, 13 (2), pp.75-110 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00305484 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL |
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