Determinants and consequences of soft budget constraints. An empirical analysis using enterprise-level data in transition countries
Céline Bignebat () and
Fabian Gouret
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Abstract:
This paper presents empirical work grounded in the soft budget-constraint literature. A loan is soft when a bank cannot commit the enterprise to hold to a fixed initial budget and/or the timing of repayment. Using data collected by the EBRD (BEEPS 2002) in 26 transition economies, we analyze the determinants of managers' expectations of having a soft loan. In particular, we find that managers' expectations are lower when the initial financing requires collateral, and higher for larger firms and when firms had recently experienced financial distress. We also provide evidence that managers' expectations influence their price responsiveness.
Keywords: Soft budget constraint; Eastern Europe (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00308719v1
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Published in Economics of Transition, 2008, 16 (3), pp.503-535. ⟨10.1111/j.1468-0351.2008.00324.x⟩
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Working Paper: Determinants and consequences of soft budget constraints. An empirical analysis using enterprise-level data in transition countries (2008) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00308719
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0351.2008.00324.x
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