A value for bi-cooperative games

Christophe Labreuche () and Michel Grabisch
Additional contact information
Christophe Labreuche: Laboratoire Albert Fert (ex-UMPhy Unité mixte de physique CNRS/Thales) - THALES [France] - Université Paris-Saclay - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Bi-cooperative games were introduced by Bilbao et al. as a generalization of TU cooperative games, in which each player can participate positively, negatively, or not at all. In this paper, we propose a definition of a share of the worth obtained by some players after they decided on their participation in the game. It turns out that the cost allocation rule does not look for a given player to her contribution at the opposite participation option to the one she chooses. The relevance of the value is discussed on several examples.

Keywords: Bi-cooperative games; Value; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-11
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00308738
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2008, 37 (3), pp.409-438. ⟨10.1007/s00182-008-0126-5⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00308738/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: A value for bi-cooperative games (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00308738

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-008-0126-5

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().