Winner's curse in toll road concessions

Laure Athias and Antonio Núñez
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Antonio Núñez: LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENTPE - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We empirically assess the effect of the winner's curse in auctions for toll road concessions, taking into account, to our knowledge for the first time, problems of commitment and enforcement, using a unique dataset of 49 worldwide road concessions.

Keywords: Auctions; Common value; Winner's curse; Incomplete contracts; Concessions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published in Economics Letters, 2008, 101 (3), pp.172-174. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2008.07.017⟩

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Journal Article: Winner's curse in toll road concessions (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00331821

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2008.07.017

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