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How Can Gender Discrimination Explain Fertility Behaviors and Family-friends Policies?

Magali Recoules ()
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Magali Recoules: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This paper focuses on the interaction between gender discrimination and household decisions. It develops a general equilibrium model with endogenous fertility, endogenous labor supply and endogenous size of government spending. Family policies are assumed to decrease the time that parents spend on their children. The model shows that gender discrimination may explain differences in household decisions between countries. The solution shows a U-shaped relationship between fertility and gender discrimination. An increase in the discrimination level implies a related decrease in fertility, women's participation in the labor force and in family-friendly policies.

Keywords: public policies; Discrimination; gender; fertility; labor supply; genre; fécondité; offre de travail; politiques publiques (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00348904
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Published in 2008

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