Réduction de la durée du travail: de la contrainte légale à la négociation

Antoine d'Autume and Pierre Cahuc

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of various worksharing policies on employment. The first part is devoted to a partial equilibrium analysis. A com­pulsory reduction in work hours, compulsory negotiation on hours, and subsidies to shorter work hours all can increase employment if the decrease in working time improves productivity. The second part of the paper is devoted to a general equili­brium analysis, with labour mobility accross firms and endogenous capital. It is shown that the fall in employees wage induced by the reduction in working time must be passed on to the income of unemployed workers in order to avoid a wage drift that could neutralize, in the long run, the positive impact of a shorter working time on employment.

Keywords: réduction du temps de travail; charges sociales; durée du travail; partenaires sociaux; temps libre (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Published in Revue Economique, 1997, 48 (3), pp.549-558. ⟨10.2307/3502841⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Réduction de la durée du travail: de la contrainte légale à la négociation (1997)
Working Paper: Réduction de la durée du travail: de la contrainte légale à la négociation (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00429969

DOI: 10.2307/3502841

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