A model of influence with a continuum of actions

Michel Grabisch and Agnieszka Rusinowska

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: In the paper, we generalize a two-action (yes-no) model of influence to a framework in which every player has a continuum of actions and he has to choose one of them. We assume the set of actions to be an interval. Each player has an inclination to choose one of the actions. Due to influence among players, the final decision of a player, i.e., his choice of one action, may be different from his original inclination. In particular, a coalition of players with the same inclination may influence another player with different inclination, and as a result of this influence, the decision of the player is closer to the inclination of the influencing coalition than his inclination was. We introduce and study a measure of such a positive influence of a coalition on a player. Several unanimous influence functions in this generalized framework are considered. Moreover, we investigate other tools for analyzing influence, like the concept of a follower of a given coalition, its particular case - a perfect follower, and the kernel of an influence function. We study properties of these concepts. Also the set of fixed points under a given influence function is analyzed. Furthermore, we study linear influence functions. We also introduce a measure of a negative influence of a coalition on a player.

Keywords: action; decision; influence index; unanimous influence function; follower of a coalition; kernel; fixed point; linear influence function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00464460
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in 2009

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Working Paper: A model of influence with a continuum of actions (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00464460

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