Aggregating sets of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities
Eric Danan (),
Thibault Gajdos () and
Jean-Marc Tallon ()
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Jean-Marc Tallon: PSE - Paris School of Economics, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
We analyze the aggregation problem without the assumption that individuals and society have fully determined and observable preferences. More precisely, we endow individuals ans society with sets of possible von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions over lotteries. We generalize the classical neutrality assumption to this setting and characterize the class of neutral social welfare function. This class turns out to be considerably broader for indeterminate than for determinate utilities, where it basically reduces to utilitarianism. In particular, aggregation rules may differ by the relationship between individual and social indeterminacy. We characterize several subclasses of neutral aggregation rules and show that utilitarian rules are those that yield the least indeterminate social utilities, although they still fail to systematically yield a determinate social utility.
Keywords: Agrégation; fonction d'utilité vNM; indétermination; neutralité; utilitarianisme; Aggregation; vNM utility; indeterminacy; neutrality; utilitarianism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in 2010
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Journal Article: Aggregating sets of von Neumann–Morgenstern utilities (2013)
Working Paper: Aggregating sets of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00523448
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