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Unemployment and relative labor market institutions between trading partners

Herve Boulhol

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This paper contributes to the literature that highlights the role of trading partners' institutions for a country's unemployment rate. The objective is to study whether the results established in the minimum wage setting of Davis (1998) hold when unemployment is driven by search frictions. This paper finds that relative labor market institutions matter for equilibrium unemployment as they generate comparative advantages, but there are two main differences with Davis. With North-North trade, unemployment decreases in the low-regulation country. When South is brought into the picture, low-regulation North is not insulated, and unemployment increases in both developed countries as a result of specialization.

Keywords: Unemployment; labor market institutions; trade; Chômage; institutions du marché du travail; commerce (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00544010
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Published in 2010

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Related works:
Journal Article: Unemployment and relative labor market institutions between trading partners (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Unemployment and relative labor market institutions between trading partners (2010) Downloads
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