Une preuve alternative de l'existence d'un équilibre de Nash dans les jeux discontinus

Jean-Marc Bonnisseau, Pascal Gourdel and Hakim Hammami ()
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Hakim Hammami: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, Ecole Polytechnique de Tunisie - EPT

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This Note presents a theorem of the existence of the Nash equilibrium for discontinuous games in a topological vector space. We will use an assumption of better reply secure which is stronger then that of Reny. If the payoff function is upper semi-continuous, the two assumptions coincide. Our proof is simple, independent and based on a version of Fan-Browder theorem of existence of maximal element due to Deguire and Lassonde, which is extended to the non-Hausdorf case.

Keywords: Fixed points; discontinuous payoff; non-Hausdorf space; secured payoff; points fixes; paiements discontinus; espaces non séparés; paiements sécurisés (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06-01
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Published in Comptes rendus de l'Académie des sciences. Série I, Mathématique, 2009, 347 (11-12), pp.701-704. ⟨10.1016/j.crma.2009.03.024⟩

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Related works:
Working Paper: Une preuve alternative de l'existence d'un équilibre de Nash dans les jeux discontinus (2009)
Working Paper: Une preuve alternative de l'existence d'un équilibre de Nash dans les jeux discontinus (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00626718

DOI: 10.1016/j.crma.2009.03.024

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