Carbon tax and OPEC's rents under a ceiling constraint

Rémy Dullieux, Lionel Ragot () and Katheline Schubert
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Rémy Dullieux: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We study the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE) of a game between oil-importing countries, who seek to maintain the atmospheric carbon concentration under a given ceiling, and oil-exporting countries. The oil-importing countries set a carbon tax and the oil-exporting countries control the producer price. We obtain implicit feedback rules and explicit non-linear time paths of extraction, carbon tax, and producer price. Consumers are always able to reap some share of the scarcity and monopoly rents, whereas producers partially pre-empt the carbon tax only if the marginal damage under the ceiling is small. We compare the MPNE to the efficient, open-loop, and cartel-without-tax equilibria.

Keywords: Global warming; differential games; non-linear strategies; non-renewable resources (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00976591v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2011, 113 (4), pp.798-824. ⟨10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01678.x⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Carbon Tax and OPEC’s Rents Under a Ceiling Constraint (2011)
Working Paper: Carbon tax and OPEC's rents under a ceiling constraint (2011)
Working Paper: Carbon tax and OPEC's rents under a ceiling constraint (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00976591

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01678.x

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