 Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemologyFranz Dietrich and Christian List Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL Abstract: Bayesian epistemology tells us with great precision how we should move from prior to posterior beliefs in light of new evidence or information, but says little about where our prior beliefs come from. It o§ers few resources to describe some prior beliefs as rational or well-justiÖed, and others as irrational or unreasonable. A di§erent strand of epistemology takes the central epistemological question to be not how to change oneís beliefs in light of new evidence, but what reasons justify a given set of beliefs in the Örst place. We o§er an account of rational belief formation that closes some of the gap between Bayesianism and its reason-based alternative, formalizing the idea that an agent can have reasons for his or her (prior) beliefs, in addition to evidence or information in the ordinary Bayesian sense. Our analysis of reasons for belief is part of a larger programme of research on the role of reasons in rational agency (Dietrich and List 2012a,b). Keywords: Bayesian epistemology; doxastic reasons; prior and posterior beliefs; principle of insu¢ cient reason; belief formation; belief change (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Synthese, 2013, 190, pp.787-808. ⟨10.1007/s11229-012-0224-6⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00978005 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-012-0224-6 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL |
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