Autonomous coalitions

Stéphane Gonzalez () and Michel Grabisch

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We consider in this paper solutions for TU-games where it is not assumed that the grand coalition is necessarily the final state of cooperation. Partitions of the grand coalition, or balanced collections together with a system of balancing weights interpreted as a time allocation vector are considered as possible states of cooperation. The former case corresponds to the c-core, while the latter corresponds to the aspiration core or d-core, where in both case, the best configuration (called a maximising collection) is sought. We study maximising collections and characterize them with autonomous coalitions, that is, coalitions for which any solution of the d-core yields a payment for that coalition equal to its worht. In particular we show that the collection of autonomous coalitions is balanced, and that one cannot have at the same time a single possible payment (core element) and a single possible configuration. We also introduce the notion of inescapable coalitions, that is, those present in every maximising collection. We characterize the class of games for which the sets of autonomous coalitions, vital coalitions (in the sense of Shellshear and Sudhölter), and inescapable coalitions coincide, and prove that the set of games having a unique maximising coalition is dense in the set of games.

Keywords: cooperative game; core; balancedness; c-core; aspiration core; coalition formation; autonomous coalitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01021328v1
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Published in 2014, pp.44

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Related works:
Journal Article: Autonomous coalitions (2015)
Working Paper: Autonomous coalitions (2015)
Working Paper: Autonomous coalitions (2015)
Working Paper: Autonomous coalitions (2015)
Working Paper: Autonomous coalitions (2014)
Working Paper: Autonomous coalitions (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01021328

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