EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Reducing Evolutionary Stability to Pure Strategies in Positive Semidefinite Games

Ido Polak () and Joseph Abdou
Additional contact information
Ido Polak: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This paper introduces a class of games called the positive semidefinite games, for which we show the absence of mixed and nonstrict ESS's. As a result, a strategy is an ESS if and only if it is strict Nash. One famous example in this class of games is Rock{Paper{Scissors. For a smaller class of games called the positive definite games, we prove a similar result forThis paper introduces a class of games called the positive semidefinite games, for which we show the absence of mixed and nonstrict ESS's. As a result, a strategy is an ESS if and only if it is strict Nash. One famous example in this class of games is Rock{Paper{Scissors. For a smaller class of games called the positive definite games, we prove a similar result for NSS's. This result opens the door to a corollary: for doubly symmetric games, the existence of an ESS is assured. This is an interesting result because of the stronger dynamic stability properties of ESS's as compared to NSS's. The coordination games played on the identity matrix are an example of games in this latter class. NSS's. This result opens the door to a corollary: for doubly symmetricgames, the existence of an ESS is assured. This is an interesting result because of the stronger dynamic stability properties of ESS's as compared to NSS's. The coordination games played on the identity matrix are anexample of games in this latter class.

Keywords: Evolutionary Stability; pure equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-hpe
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01066397
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01066397/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Reducing Evolutionary Stability to Pure Strategies in Positive Semidefinite Games (2014) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01066397

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().

 
Page updated 2023-07-09
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01066397