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Dynamic Allocation of Objects to Queuing Agents: The Discrete Model

Francis Bloch and David Cantala ()

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This paper analyzes the optimal allocation of objects which arrive sequentially to agents organized in a waiting list. Applications include the assignment of social housing, deceased donor organs and daycare slots. A mechanism is a probability distribution over all priority orders which are consistent with the waiting list. We consider three efficiency criteria: first order stochastic dominance in the vector of agents' values, the probability of misallocation and the expected waste. We show that the strict seniority order dominates uniform random order according to the two first criteria, and the uniform random order dominates strict priority according to the third criterion. If agents values are perfectly correlated, strict priority dominates all other probabilistic mechanisms for all agents values.

Keywords: dynamic matching; queuing; queuing disciplines; social housing; organ transplant (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-ure
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01109667v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in 2014

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Working Paper: Dynamic Allocation of Objects to Queuing Agents: The Discrete Model (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Dynamic Allocation of Objects to Queuing Agents: The Discrete Model (2014) Downloads
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