Does Uncertainty Deter Provision of Public Goods?

Béatrice Boulu-Reshef, Samuel Brott () and Adam Zylbersztejn ()
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Samuel Brott: Berkeley Research Group, LLC

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We study a finitely repeated public goods game (based on the voluntary contribution mechanism) played under complete uncertainty about the marginal benefit of the public good relative to the private consumption (commonly known as the marginal per capita return): neither one's marginal per capita return nor other players' marginal per capita returns are known at the time of decision-making. We show that contributions are equivalent when the rate of return is predetermined and when it is uncertain, and display a similar decay over time. Combined with the previous experimental findings, our results suggest that the cooperation in public goods games is sensitive to the source of uncertainty about marginal per capita return.

Keywords: Cooperation; uncertainty; voluntary contribution mechanism; public good; expected return; incertitude; mécanisme de contribution volontaire; bien public; rendement attendu (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-pub
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01441053v1
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Published in 2017

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Related works:
Journal Article: Does Uncertainty Deter Provision of Public Goods? (2017)
Working Paper: Does Uncertainty Deter Provision of Public Goods? (2017)
Working Paper: Does Uncertainty Deter Provision of Public Goods? (2017)
Working Paper: Does Uncertainty Deter Provision of Public Goods? (2017)
Working Paper: Does Uncertainty Deter Provision of Public Goods? (2017)
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