Communication Games with Optional Verification
Simon Schopohl ()
Additional contact information
Simon Schopohl: EDEEM - Université Paris 1 - EDEEM - European Doctorate in Economics Erasmus Mundus, Universität Bielefeld, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
We consider a Sender-Receiver game in which the Sender can choose between sending a cheap-talk message, which is costless, but also not verified and a costly verified message. While the Sender knows the true state of the world, the Receiver does not have this information, but has to choose an action depending on the message he receives. The action then yields to some utility for Sender and Receiver. We only make a few assumptions about the utility functions of both players, so situations may arise where the Sender's preferences are such that she sends a message trying to convince the Receiver about a certain state of the world, which is not the true one. In a finite setting we state conditons for full revelation, i.e. when the Receiver always learns the truth. Furthermore we describe the player's behavior if only partial revelation is possible. For a continuous setting we show that additional conditions have to hold and that these do not hold for "smooth" preferences and utility, e.g. in the classic example of quadratic loss utilities.
Keywords: verifiable information; cheap-talk; communication; costly disclosure; full revelation; increasing differences; Sender-Receiver game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-upt
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01490688
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Published in 2017
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Communicaiton games with optional verification (2018)
Working Paper: Communication Games with Optional Verification (2017)
Working Paper: Communication games with optional verification (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01490688
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().