Dynamic competition over social networks Dynamic competition over social networks
Antoine Mandel () and
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Antoine Mandel: PSE - Paris School of Economics, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
We provide an analytical approach to the problem of influence maximization in a social network when two players compete by means of dynamic targeting strategies. We formulate the problem as a two-player zero-sum stochastic game. We prove the existence of the uniform value: if the players are sufficiently patient, both players can guarantee the same mean-average opinion without knowing the exact discount factor. Further, we put forward some elements for the characterization of equilibrium strategies. In general, players must implement a trade-off between a forward-looking perspective, according to which they shall aim at maximizing the future spread of their opinion in the network, and a backward-looking perspective, according to which they shall aim at counteracting their opponent's previous actions. When the influence potential of players is small, an equilibrium strategy is to systematically target the agent with the largest eigenvector centrality.
Keywords: Stochastic games; Social network; Dynamic games; Targeting; Jeux stochastiques; Jeux dynamiques; Réseaux sociaux (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Published in 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01524453
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