Aggregation of Bayesian preferences: Unanimity vs Monotonicity
Federica Ceron () and
Vassili Vergopoulos ()
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Federica Ceron: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics
Vassili Vergopoulos: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics
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This article reconsiders the issue of Bayesian aggregation by pointing at a conflict that may arise between two logically independent dominance criteria, Pareto dominance and statewise dominance, that are commonly imposed on social preferences. We propose a weaker dominance axiom that restricts statewise dominance to Pareto dominant alternatives and Pareto dominance to statewise dominant alternatives. The associated aggregation rule is a convex combination of two components., the first being a weighted sum of the individuals' subjective expected utility (SEU) functional, the second being a social SEU functional, with associated social utility function and social belief. Such representation establishes the existence of a trade off between adherence to the Pareto principle and compliance with statewise dominance. We then investigate what are the consequences of adding to our assumptions either of the two dominance criteria in their full force and obtain that each of them is equivalent to discarding the other, unless there is essentially a common prior probability.
Keywords: Pareto dominance; Monotonicity; Preference aggregation; Social choice; Subjective expected utility; Dominance de Pareto; monotonicité; agrégation des préférences; choix social; utilité espérée subjective (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Published in 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01539444
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