EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions

Agnieszka Rusinowska () and Akylai Taalaibekova ()
Additional contact information
Agnieszka Rusinowska: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics
Akylai Taalaibekova: CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain] - UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We consider a model of competitive opinion formation in which three persuaders characterized by (possibly unequal) persuasion impacts try to influence opinions in a society of individuals embedded in a social network. Two of the persuaders have the extreme and opposite opinions, and the third one has the centrist opinion. Each persuader chooses one individual to target, i.e., he forms a link with the chosen individual in order to spread his own "point of view" in the society and to get the average long run opinion as close as possible to his own opinion. We examine the opinion convergence and consensus reaching in the society. We study the existence and characterization of pure strategy Nash equilibria in the game played by the persuaders with equal impacts. This characterization depends on influenceability and centrality (intermediacy) of the targets. We discuss the effect of the centrist persuader on the consensus and symmetric equilibria, compared to the framework with only two persuaders having the extreme opinions. When the persuasion impacts are unequal with one persuader having a sufficiently large impact, the game has only equilibria in mixed strategies.

Keywords: social network; opinion formation; targeting; extreme and centrist persuaders; réseau social; formation d'opinion; consensus; ciblage; lobbying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2018-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01720017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Published in 2018

Downloads: (external link)
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01720017/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01720017

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().

 
Page updated 2019-10-01
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01720017