Political Contestability and Contract Rigidity: An Analysis of Procurement Contracts

Jean Beuve (), Marian Moszoro and Stephane Saussier ()
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Jean Beuve: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Are public contracts less adaptable than private contracts? Using a comprehensive set of contracts for a standard product, we compare procurement contracts in which the procurer is either a public administration or a private corporation. We find that public-to-private contracts feature more rigidity clauses than private-to-private contracts and that the use of rigidity clauses in public contracts rises when political risks are more salient. We argue that a significant part of the increased rigidity of public contracts is a contractual adaptation to limit political hazards from political opponents and interested third parties.

Keywords: Procurement; Political Contestability; Contractual Rigidity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2019, 28 (2), pp.316-335. ⟨10.1111/jems.12268⟩

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Working Paper: Political Contestability and Contract Rigidity: An Analysis of Procurement Contracts (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-02057712

DOI: 10.1111/jems.12268

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