Reasoning In versus About Attitudes: How Attitude Formation is Beyond Logic
Franz Dietrich and
Antonios Staras ()
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
One reasons not just in beliefs, but also in intentions, preferences, and other attitudes. For instance, one forms preferences from preferences, or intentions from beliefs and preferences. Formal logic has proved useful for modelling reasoning in beliefs-the formation of beliefs from beliefs. Can logic also model reasoning in multiple attitudes? We identify principled obstacles. Logic can model reasoning about attitudes. But this models the discovery of attitudes of (usually) others, not the formation of one's own attitudes. Beliefs are special in that reasoning in beliefs can follow logical entailment between belief contents. This makes beliefs the privileged target of logic, when applying logic to psychology.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03023015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Reasoning In versus About Attitudes: How Attitude Formation is Beyond Logic (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-03023015
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().