Equilibrium with non-convex preferences: some insights

Cuong Le Van () and Ngoc-Sang Pham
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Cuong Le Van: IPAG Business School, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We study the existence of equilibrium when agents' preferences may not be convex. For some specific utility functions, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which there exists an equilibrium. The standard approach cannot be directly applied to our examples because the demand correspondence of some agents is neither single-valued nor convex-valued.

Keywords: general equilibrium.; Non-convex preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-03-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Working Paper: Equilibrium with non-convex preferences: some insights (2025)
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