Shaping Social Norms: How Experience Affects Moral Judgments

Roberto Galbiati (), Emeric Henry () and Nicolas Jacquemet ()
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Roberto Galbiati: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Emeric Henry: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Nicolas Jacquemet: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: What actions other people judge appropriate drives pro-social behavior. We show that such judgments depend on whether the observers previously faced the situation they judge (active observers) or not (passive observers). In an online giving experiment, active observers make more polarized judgments than passive ones -those who acted pro-socially judge selfish behavior more harshly and praise pro-social actions more. Moreover, active observers persistently avoid payoff-relevant information, both as dictators, likely to maintain their self-image, and then as observers. Our results imply a new link between descriptive (what most people do) and injunctive norms (what groups deem appropriate).

Keywords: Observers; Injunctive norms; Descriptive norms; Polarization; Observers Injunctive norms Descriptive norms Polarization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-06-16
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