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Tarik Tazdaït, Moussa Larbani and Rabia Nessah ()

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Abstract: Based on the notion of equilibrium of a coalition P relatively to a coalition K, of Berge, Zhukovskii has introduced Berge equilibrium as an alternative solution to Nash equilibrium for non cooperative games in normal form. The essential advantage of this equilibrium is that it does not require negotiation of any player with the remaining players, which is not the case when a game has more than one Nashequilibrium. The problem of existence of Berge equilibrium is more difficult (compared to that of Nash). This paper is a contribution to the problem of existence and computation of Berge equilibrium of a non cooperative game. Indeed, using the g-maximum equality, we establish the existence of a Berge equilibrium of a non-cooperative game in normal form. In addition, we give sufficient conditions for theexistence of a Berge equilibrium which is also a Nash equilibrium. This allows us to get equilibria enjoying the properties of both concepts of solution. Finally, using these results, we provide two methods for the computation of Berge equilibria: the first one computes Berge equilibria; the second one computes Berge equilibria which are also Nash equilibria.

Keywords: Berge equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; individually rational; g-maximum equality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-10-20
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Working Paper: On Berge Equilibria (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: ON BERGE EQUILIBRIUM (2007) Downloads
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