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A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis

Philippe Jehiel () and Laurent Lamy

CIRED Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We revisit the Tiebout hypothesis in a world in which agents may learn extra information as to how they value the various local public goods once located, and jurisdictions are free to commit to whatever mechanism to attract citizens. It is shown in quasi-linear environments that efficiency can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium when jurisdictions seek to maximize local revenues but not necessarily when they seek to maximize local welfare. Interpretations and limitations of the result are discussed.

Keywords: mechanism design; competing mechanisms; endogenous entry; Tiebout hypothesis; local public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-ure
Date: 2017-07
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01557585
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Related works:
Journal Article: A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis (2018)
Working Paper: A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis (2018)
Working Paper: A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis (2015) Downloads
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