Europe de la défense. Quel processus d'allocation ?

Martial Foucault ()
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Martial Foucault: RSCAS - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies - EUI - European University Institute - Institut Universitaire Européen, LAEP - LAboratoire d'Economie Publique - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

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Abstract: The European Union has decided to implement in 1999 an independent European security and defence policy (ESDP). As preferences in defence issues are strongly heterogeneous, it is required to determine the kind of allocation process for providing defence resources within this European space. By assuming European security as an impure public good due to spillin effects and considering an economics of alliance framework, this article aims at verifying whether a Nash- Cournot process or Lindhal process is better suitable for the ESDP. Based on an econometric analysis for the 1980-2002 period, it is verified that the Europe of Defence follows a Nash-Cournot process for 10 out of 15 European countries. This result emphasizes the difficulty for defining a fiscal price in defence.

Date: 2006-05
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Published in Revue Economique, 2006, 57 (3), pp.407-418

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00122067

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