The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger Control

Jean Tirole, Marc Ivaldi, Patrick Rey and Paul Seabright ()
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Paul Seabright: GREMAQ - Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Date: 2007
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Published in The Political Economy of Antitrust, Elsevier Science, pp.217-240, 2007

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