Fair social orderings

Marc Fleurbaey and Francois Maniquet

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Abstract: In a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which depend only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. In order to avoid Arrovian-type impossibilities, we let those social preferences take account of the shape of individual indifference curves. This allows us to introduce equity and cross-economy robustness properties, inspired by the theory of fair allocation. Combining such properties, we characterize two families of fair social orderings.

Keywords: social orderings; fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

Published in Economic Theory, 2008, 34, pp.25-45

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Working Paper: Fair social orderings (2009)
Journal Article: Fair social orderings (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00246525

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