Two criteria for social decisions

Marc Fleurbaey

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Abstract: This paper studies the ethical underpinnings of two social criteria which are prominent in the literature dealing with the problem of evaluating allocations of several consumption goods in a population with heteregenous preferences. The Pazner-Schmeidler criterion and the Egalitarian Walras criterion are prima facie quite different. But it is shown here that these criteria are related to close variants of the fairness condition that an allocation is better when every individual bundle in it dominates the average consumption in another allocation. In addition, the results suggest that the Pazner-Schmeidler criterion can be viewed as the best extension of the Walrasian criterion to non-convex economies.

Keywords: social welfare; social choice; fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 134, pp.421-447

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Journal Article: Two criteria for social decisions (2007)
Working Paper: Two Criteria for Social Decisions (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00246595

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