Ownership structure, corporate governance and analyst following. A study of french listed firms

Sabri Boubaker and Florence Labégorre
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Florence Labégorre: LEM - Lille - Economie et Management - Université de Lille, Sciences et Technologies - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This study investigates the effects of some characteristics of the French corporate governance model – deemed to foster entrenchment and facilitate private benefits extraction – on the extent of analyst following. The results show that analysts are more likely to follow firms both with high discrepancy level between ownership and control and those controlled through pyramiding. These findings provide empirical support to the argument that minority shareholders value private information on firms with high expropriation likelihood, asking thence for more analyst services. Additional findings show that analysts are reticent to follow firms managed by controlling family members. This is, in part, explained by these firms' reliance on private communication channels rather than public disclosure, producing a poor informational environment.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Private benefits of control; Pyramids; Analyst following (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-06-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (41)

Published in Journal of Banking and Finance, 2008, 32 (6), pp.961-976. ⟨10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.07.010⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Ownership structure, corporate governance and analyst following: A study of French listed firms (2008)
Working Paper: Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Analyst Following: A Study of French Listed Firms (2008)
Working Paper: Ownership structure, corporate governance and analyst following. A study of french listed firms (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00257732

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.07.010

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