Strutture illegali permanenti: la pirateria commerciale nel mercato dei beni di design

Pierre-Jean Benghozi (pierre-jean.benghozi@polytechnique.edu) and Walter Santagata
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Pierre-Jean Benghozi: CRG - Centre de recherche en gestion - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Walter Santagata: CRG - Centre de recherche en gestion - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Market piracy in the design-based industry is an expanding worldwide phenomenon (Grossman and Shapiro, 1988a,b; Chaudhry and Walsh, 1996; Schultz II and Saprito, 1996). It deserves a great deal of attention both because of its impressive international dimension (Verma, 1996) and its intrinsic illegality, ambiguity and powerfull potential links with criminal organizations (Andreano and Sigfried, 1980; Fiorentini and Peltzman, 1995). The aim of this paper is to develop theoretical arguments about economic agents' behavior and to shed some light on the main regulatory issues of illegal markets.

Keywords: evolution of structure and organisations markets; creative industries; business model; gouvernance; distribution industrielle; innovation; fraude (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Published in Stato e mercato, 2001, 1, pp.135-160

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00262561

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