Properties and applications of dual reduction

Yannick Viossat

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Abstract: The dual reduction process, introduced by Myerson, allows a finite game to be reduced to a smaller-dimensional game such that any correlated equilibrium of the reduced game is an equilibrium of the original game. We study the properties and applications of this process. It is shown that generic two-player normal form games have a unique full dual reduction (a known refinement of dual reduction) and all strat- egies that have probability zero in all correlated equilibria are eliminated in all full dual reductions. Among other applications, we give a linear programming proof of the fact that a unique correlated equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, and improve on a result due to Nau, Gomez-Canovas and Hansen on the geometry of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria.

Keywords: correlated equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; dual reduction; équilibre corrélé; équilibre de Nash; réduction duale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00264031v2
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Published in Economic Theory, 2010, 44, pp.53--68. ⟨10.1007/s00199-009-0477-6⟩

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Journal Article: Properties and applications of dual reduction (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00264031

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-009-0477-6

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