Does the representation of the household behavior matter for welfare analysis of tax-benefit policies ?

Olivier Bargain, Miriam Beblo, Denis Beninger (), Richard Blundell (), Raquel Carrasco (), Marie-Concetta Chiuri, Francois Laisney, Valérie Lechene, Nicolas Moreau, Michal Myck, Javier Ruiz-Castillo and Frederic Vermeulen
Additional contact information
Miriam Beblo: Centre for European Economic Research (Mannheim, Germany) - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - University of Mannheim = Universität Mannheim
Denis Beninger: Centre for European Economic Research (Mannheim, Germany) - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - University of Mannheim = Universität Mannheim
Marie-Concetta Chiuri: Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic Economics (CHILD) - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic Economics (CHILD), UNIBA - Università degli studi di Bari Aldo Moro = University of Bari Aldo Moro
Valérie Lechene: IFS - Laboratory of the Institute for Fiscal Studies - Institute for Fiscal Studies, University of Oxford

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: A widely shared intuition holds that individual control over money matters for the decision process within the household and the subsequent distribution of resources and welfare. As a consequence, there are good reasons to depart from the unitary model of the household and to explore the possibilities offered by models of the family accounting for several decision makers in the household and for the potential impact of tax reforms on the balance of power. This paper summarizes both the methodological and empirical findings presented in the next three papers of this special issue of the Review of the Economics of the Household. This series of contributions primarily entails a concrete comparison of the policy implications of the choice between the unitary and a particular multi-person representation: the collective representation. On the one hand, it suggests a methodology to implement the collective model of labor supply in a realistic context where participation is modeled together with working hours, and where the full tax-benefit system is accounted for. On the other hand, the empirical part relies on comprehensive simulations of tax reforms in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, and allows to quantify the distortions that may affect policy recommendations based on the unitary model

Keywords: Collective model; Household labor supply; Intra household allocations; Tax reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published in Review of Economics of the Household, 2006, 4, pp.99-111. ⟨10.1007/s11150-006-0001-8⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279212

DOI: 10.1007/s11150-006-0001-8

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().