The Loser Pays

Qui perd paye

Frédéric Lordon () and Pepita Ould-Ahmed ()
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Frédéric Lordon: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Pepita Ould-Ahmed: TEM - Travail et mondialisation

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Abstract: For reasons going far beyond economic analysis, European law on competition loathes state aid to companies in difficulty. A case study on the rescue of the Credit Lyonnais reveals the principle: the Commission criticises the fact that because companies know they can benefit from state aid, they take rash risks without assuming the consequences. State assistance is blameworthy insofar as it goes against the "moral rule of the market" according to which bankruptcy is the normal sanction of poor management. Therefore, the Commission stigmatizes less the distortions to competition generated by state aid than what is viewed as far more reprehensible forms of distortion: market ethics and the natural business life and death. The considerable guarantees the Commission requests before it authorizes aid can be seen as a sort of punishment substituted for the pains of bankruptcy or restructuring that the company "normally" would have had to face.

Date: 2006
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Published in Critique Internationale, 2006, 4 (33), pp.55-78. ⟨10.3917/crii.033.0055⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279296

DOI: 10.3917/crii.033.0055

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