La coordination des acteurs lors d'une attaque spéculative

Camille Cornand

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Abstract: This article surveys the literature on the question of the coordination of actors during international currency and financial crises. Until recently, this question had not found any satisfying theoretical answer. We briefly present why traditional self-fulfilling models of speculative attack lead to an indeterminacy in the theory before considering the contribution of the global games' theory applied to speculative attacks and its implications in terms of economic policy. We finally evoke the challenges this new literature has to face.

Keywords: Coordination; Speculative attack; Global games; Attaque spéculative; Jeux globaux (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2004, 114 (6), pp.793-820

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279315

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